Vladimir Putin’s approval rating has been declining for the seventh consecutive week. According to VCIOM data as of April 19, 2026, the figure stands at 65.6%.
Context and Dynamics:
- Scale of the Decline: Since the beginning of the year, the rating has lost 12.2 percentage points, marking the sharpest drop since the 2018 pension reform.
- Comparison with 2022: It is crucial to note that after the start of the war, the rating experienced an anomalous surge. The current decline is largely a correction—a “deflating” of that mobilization reserve. Despite the loss of points, the rating remains within a zone of stability; the drop is statistically significant but not critical for the system’s resilience.
Changes in Figures (VCIOM):
- April 2026: -4.5 p.p.
- March 2026: -7.9 p.p.
- Current Level: 65.6% (compared to ~80% at the peaks of 2022–23).
Analytical Summary: The Policy of Freezing and an Adaptive Society
The current situation in Russia in 2026 is a classic example of “material fatigue,” which, however, does not lead to structural failure.
Key Takeaways:
- Lack of Feedback Loop: In the Russian political model, citizens’ opinions do not serve as a trigger for a change in course. The Kremlin does not operate within the logic of Western electoral cycles; therefore, one should not expect a “rollback” (such as unblocking resources or lowering taxes) due to falling numbers. The government makes it clear: the course is set and remains unchanged.
- Tactics of “Freezing”: Instead of taking a step back, the system chooses a waiting mode. If a decision causes irritation (such as the Telegram blocking or tax pressure), the Kremlin simply “freezes” further movement in that direction for a short period, allowing society to get used to the new conditions. Once the population adapts, the system continues along its intended path.
- Apathy as a Foundation: The “silent alienation” noted by sociologists actually suits the authorities. For the current regime, passive discontent is far safer than active support, which requires constant resource feeding. Society “grows tired,” but this exhaustion is converted into private escapism rather than political protest.
The Bottom Line: we are witnessing the formation of a specific social landscape where the government and society exist in parallel realities. The system possesses a sufficient margin of safety to ignore the loss of a few percentage points of popularity, replacing popular “love” with control technologies and the strategic ignoring of public opinion. Such is the reality of Russian politics: the numbers fall, but the vector remains the same.