Slava Sobetski

Deripaska’s Aluminum Empire Turns Unprofitable for the First Time in 11 Years

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The Russian aluminum giant Rusal reported a net annual loss of $455 million for 2025, marking its first negative result since 2014. Although revenue increased by 17% to $14.1 billion due to a late-year spike in global metal prices, it was not enough to offset a massive surge in costs. The company’s finances were hit by a 71% increase in debt servicing costs, a 12% rise in production costs, and a 25% jump in commercial and logistics expenses. Consequently, Rusal reduced aluminum production by 1.9%, citing “capacity optimization.” Sanctions have also shifted sales geography: the European market share dropped from 21% to 14%, while China now accounts for 35% of all exports. Analytical summary: Rusal’s loss in March 2026 clearly demonstrates that even high global prices cannot compensate for the structural flaws in Russian industry. Rising debt and logistical bottlenecks are making metal exports increasingly unprofitable. While pivoting to China saves sales volumes, it leaves the company heavily dependent on Beijing’s pricing power. Even with existing EU quotas, the toxic sanctions environment has driven the “cost of survival” high enough to wipe out all profits.

Patrushev Announces Military Convoys for the Russian Merchant Fleet

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Presidential aide and head of the Maritime Board Nikolai Patrushev announced that Russia is preparing military measures to protect its commercial vessels. In an interview with Kommersant, he claimed that an “unprecedented campaign” is being waged against the Russian fleet, prompting the authorities to consider placing mobile firing groups and specialized defense systems on board ships. A key element of this strategy will be the direct escorting of merchant vessels by Russian Navy warships. Patrushev noted that the risk of maritime sabotage remains consistently high, citing the attack on the Arctic Metagaz LNG tanker in the Mediterranean on March 3, 2026, which Moscow attributes to drone strikes launched from the Libyan coast. Analytical summary: The shift to military convoy tactics in March 2026 highlights the critical vulnerability of Russia’s logistics chains amid global isolation. However, the effectiveness of such measures remains questionable: the presence of warships does not guarantee immunity, as evidenced by recent cases where Russian tankers were detained despite having armed guards. For the international community, the militarization of trade routes creates additional risks to maritime safety, turning civilian exports into a legitimate zone of military confrontation and forcing global insurers to further hike premiums for vessels handling Russian cargo.

NATO Proposes Extending Pipelines Eastward to Supply Troops in Case of War with Russia

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NATO member states are considering extending the Cold War-era pipeline network eastward to ensure rapid fuel supplies for troops. Lieutenant General Kai Rohrschneider, responsible for logistics and support within the Alliance, told Reuters that the system must reach Poland, with additional solutions needed for the Baltic states, Finland, and Romania. During the Cold War, the NATO pipeline network covered 12 countries and terminated in West Germany, where it still supplies the Ramstein Air Base and major civilian hubs like Frankfurt Airport. The pipes, buried 80 cm underground, allow for the discreet and continuous transport of fuel, which is critical in high-intensity combat scenarios. Analytical summary: The initiative to expand fuel infrastructure in March 2026 signals NATO’s shift from a “deterrence” posture to deep preparation for a potential protracted conventional conflict on the eastern flank. For the EU, this implies not only bolstered military security but also massive infrastructure investments that will link the energy and defense systems of Eastern Europe with Western hubs. Despite potential criticism regarding costs and environmental risks, the project demonstrates a clear understanding that in modern warfare, logistics and resilient supply chains are decisive factors.

Russians Report Sharp Inflation Spike Despite Official Claims of Slowdown

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Official statistics showing a slowdown in price growth in Russia directly contradict public sentiment. While the Ministry of Economic Development claims inflation slowed to 5.84% by mid-March 2026, a Public Opinion Foundation survey commissioned by the Central Bank recorded a jump in perceived inflation to 15.6% (up from 14.5% in February). This sharp increase in negative expectations was last seen in August following a radical hike in utility tariffs. VCIOM data confirms a steady trend of distrust: the inflation perception index has been rising since October. By March, 55% of respondents characterized price growth as “very high,” compared to 46% in September 2025, before the VAT increase was announced. Analytical summary: The gap between “paper” inflation of 5.8% and perceived inflation of 15.6% in March 2026 indicates that the state has effectively lost control over inflationary expectations. The VAT hike and military economy costs are being passed directly to the consumer, making official reports useless for assessing real welfare. For the EU, this serves as an indicator that the Russian economy’s “resilience” is depleting faster than macroeconomic models suggest, with internal social pressure becoming a long-term instability factor.

Real Poverty Level in Russia nears 40% Based on Public Perception

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The real level of poverty in Russia may be significantly higher than official statistics suggest. While Rosstat claims the poverty rate dropped from 7.1% to 6.7% last year, Levada Center surveys show a different trend: the share of Russians whose income exceeds their perceived minimum required for survival fell from 48% to 41% in March 2026. The discrepancy lies in the definition of “subsistence.” The official poverty line is set at 17.1–18.6k rubles, whereas citizens estimate the necessary minimum at 43.8k rubles per person. According to income distribution data, 39.7% of Russians fall below this self-defined threshold. Furthermore, the average per capita family income is only 37k rubles, failing to meet even basic subsistence expectations. Expectations for a “normal life” have also seen record growth, reaching 80.1k rubles per month — a 21% annual increase, the highest since 2009. The threshold for being considered “wealthy” jumped by 40% in a year to 357.1k rubles per person. Analytical summary: The rise of the subjective poverty threshold to 40% in March 2026 highlights a profound crisis of confidence in official economic indicators. Amidst inflationary pressure and military spending, real incomes no longer meet even the minimum requirements for basic subsistence. For the EU and international observers, this signals growing internal social tension in Russia, masked by statistical manipulations but inevitably leading to the degradation of the domestic consumer market.

Putin’s Envoy Urges Trump to Sanction Europe for Iran Stance and Lift Restrictions on Russia

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Kirill Dmitriev, the Russian President’s special envoy for investment cooperation, has launched a sharp critique of Washington’s European allies. Following the EU and UK’s refusal to assist in the military operation against Iran, the head of the RDIF called on Donald Trump to impose sanctions on Europe while simultaneously lifting restrictions on Russia to “support global energy markets.” Dmitriev highlighted the friction within NATO, claiming that allies support Ukraine but ignore U.S. interests in the Iranian conflict. He echoed Donald Trump’s own rhetoric, citing the president’s description of NATO’s refusal to help unblock the Strait of Hormuz as a “very stupid mistake.” In exchange for lifting sanctions, Moscow is promising the U.S. access to joint projects valued at over $14 trillion, claiming the current restrictions have cost Washington over $300 billion. Analytical summary: Dmitriev’s proposal in March 2026 exposes Moscow’s attempt to seize the initiative during a moment of transatlantic crisis. The Kremlin is openly offering Trump a deal: abandoning “ungrateful” European allies in favor of a pragmatic partnership with Russia. Despite the colossal $14 trillion figure—which functions more as a propaganda tool than a realistic economic offer—this rhetoric appeals to certain segments of the public weary of protracted conflicts.

China’s State Refiners Resume Russian Oil Purchases Amid Middle East Supply Crunch

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China’s state-owned oil companies, which suspended Russian oil purchases late last year, are returning to the market. According to Reuters, trading arms of Sinopec and PetroChina issued inquiries for Russian crude this week for the first time since November, taking advantage of a relaxation in U.S. sanctions. Indonesia, Thailand, and Pakistan are also reportedly in similar talks. The primary driver is a severe physical supply shortage. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, a transit point for about 20% of global oil and gas, has sharply restricted access to Middle Eastern supplies. Major exporters have been forced to scale back: Saudi Arabia cut production to 8 million barrels per day, while the UAE temporarily lost 60% of its output. Under these conditions, Russian crude remains the most viable alternative, staying cheaper than competing grades from Brazil and West Africa. Analytical summary: The return of China’s state giants to Russian contracts in March 2026 is a direct consequence of Middle Eastern instability, which has proven more effective for Moscow than any lobbying efforts. For the EU, this signals that the global energy deficit provides a “window of opportunity” for the Kremlin to bypass technological and financial isolation. However, this success is situational: China is acting out of energy survival rather than political solidarity. Russia’s reliance on Asian demand only deepens as the Strait of Hormuz remains blocked, granting Beijing more leverage to demand even steeper discounts once the crisis subsides.

European Council President Costa calls for security talks with Moscow while maintaining sanctions

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The President of the European Council, António Costa, has stated that the European Union must prepare for security negotiations with Russia. In an interview with the EFE agency, the politician emphasized that Brussels should be ready to develop a dialogue to avoid undermining U.S. President Donald Trump’s efforts to establish long-term peace in Ukraine. At the same time, Costa insisted on maintaining strict economic pressure. He advocated for continuing the embargo on Russian energy imports, calling this path fundamental for the EU. Earlier, EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen voiced a similarly “uncompromising” position. Analytical summary: António Costa’s statement in March 2026 appears to be an attempt to balance two opposing positions, which raises questions about the consistency of the EU’s strategy. On one hand, Brussels declares readiness for dialogue, effectively acknowledging the need for diplomatic concessions under pressure from Washington. On the other, it insists on continuing the energy blockade, which, amid global resource shortages, continues to strain the European economy itself. This ambiguity poses risks to EU unity: an attempt to “align” with the Trump administration while maintaining old sanction mechanisms may result in the EU being excluded from shaping the new security architecture, remaining merely an enforcer of restrictive measures that are losing their effectiveness.

Russian oil exports show strongest growth in over a year following outbreak of war in Iran

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The war in Iran has triggered a sharp increase in demand for Russian crude and a surge in Russian budget revenues. According to Bloomberg vessel-tracking data, average daily oil exports for the week ending March 15, 2026, jumped to 4 million barrels. The weekly increase of approximately 1.1 million barrels marks the most significant rise in supply volumes in over a year. Simultaneously, a record growth in export revenue has been recorded. For the reported week, the value of exported oil surged by $890 million compared to the previous period, reaching $2.07 billion. This weekly revenue jump is the highest since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine. Middle East crisis impact on the market Destabilization in Iran has led to a sharp narrowing of global supply, an opportunity Moscow has quickly seized. Despite sanction pressures and Western efforts to cap prices, the supply deficit is forcing buyers toward Russian oil grades, translating into windfall profits for the Russian energy sector. The rise in prices at Russian ports, combined with increased physical shipment volumes, provides the Kremlin with a financial “buffer” to compensate for losses in other economic sectors. The current market situation effectively neutralizes efforts to isolate Russia energetically, turning the regional conflict in the Middle East into a key factor for the system’s financial stability. Analytical summary: The sharp increase in oil revenues in March 2026 due to the war in Iran provides Russia with a temporary but powerful resource to sustain military operations and cover budget deficits. For the global community, this means that geopolitical instability in the Middle East directly undermines the effectiveness of the sanctions regime, creating conditions for an influx of unplanned hard currency revenue into the Russian treasury.

Vienna identified as Russia’s largest electronic intelligence hub in Europe

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Despite mass expulsions of Russian diplomats from other EU countries, Austria remains a “safe haven” for espionage. According to the Financial Times, around 500 Russian diplomats continue to work in Vienna, with Western intelligence estimating that approximately one-third are engaged in espionage. Over the past two years, numerous new antennas and electronic surveillance systems have appeared on the roofs of Russian-owned buildings, including the Russencity residential complex. The specific nature of Austrian law is that it only allows prosecution for espionage if it directly harms Austria itself. This makes Vienna an ideal base for electronic intelligence against international organizations (UN, OSCE, IAEA, OPEC) and for intercepting data from major European satellite stations located east of the city. Satellite espionage under diplomatic cover Western intelligence agencies have noted suspicious activity involving Russian antennas: they are used not for communication with Moscow, but for targeting various satellites depending on the political agenda. For instance, during the Munich Security Conference in February, one of the largest antennas was reoriented toward the relevant sector, returning to its original position after the event ended. Experts from the NomenNescio collective note that Russencity’s location on the banks of the Danube allows for the effective interception of signals from key European communication hubs. Meanwhile, the number of accredited diplomats at the embassy remains anomalously high—over 180 people—providing reliable cover for technical intelligence specialists. Analytical summary: Vienna’s continued status as Russia’s primary intelligence hub in March 2026 demonstrates a critical flaw in the European Union’s collective security system. Austria’s use of legal loopholes allows the Kremlin to maintain technological capabilities for electronic interception and coordination of hybrid operations in the heart of Europe, compensating for the loss of agent networks in other countries of the region.