Slava Sobetski

Kazakhstan Excludes Russia from Power Plant Construction Projects

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Kazakhstan has declined the services of Russian companies for the construction of Thermal Power Plants (TPPs) in Semey, Kokshetau, and Ust-Kamenogorsk. At a government meeting, it was revealed that Kazakhstan decided to build the Kokshetau TPP independently, while the other two will be constructed by a Kazakh-Singaporean consortium involving Samruk-Energy. This decision marks a significant shift away from the preliminary agreements reached with Russia in late 2023. Key details of the policy shift: Analytical Summary: Kazakhstan’s withdrawal from the energy deal with Russia is a clear example of how high interest rates and sanction pressure on Russian banks are stripping Moscow of its status as an “infrastructure exporter.” The Collapse of Financial Diplomacy: The Kremlin’s traditional influence model—”we build, our banks provide the credit”—is no longer functional. Under current market conditions in the Russian Federation, providing preferential financing for long-term foreign projects has become an unaffordable luxury for Moscow. Astana has pragmatically chosen Singaporean investments, which are unburdened by sanction risks and offer a more transparent structure. Technological Independence: Replacing Inter RAO with domestic capabilities and Asian partners suggests that Kazakhstan no longer views Russian energy technology as indispensable. Utilizing Singaporean experience likely indicates a transition to more modern environmental and digital standards for TPP management, which is critical for the modernization of the country’s aging energy grid. Geopolitical Drift: The public rejection of agreements reached at the presidential level highlights the growing distance between Astana and Moscow. Kazakhstan continues its multi-vector policy, demonstrating that being an “EAEU ally” does not grant Russia an automatic right to major infrastructure contracts if they are not backed by real, competitive financing.

Traffic in the Strait of Hormuz Reaches Record Levels Since the Start of the U.S.-Israeli War Against Iran

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Over the past weekend, April 4 and 5, 2026, 21 vessels passed through the Strait of Hormuz—the highest two-day figure since early March, when movement in this strategic artery nearly halted due to the military operation launched by the U.S. and Israel against Iran. According to Bloomberg, the resumption of traffic was made possible by active negotiations between Tehran and governments facing acute energy shortages. The agency emphasizes that the very fact of these negotiations strengthens Iran’s grip over the strait. Key details of the current situation: Analytical Summary: The surge in traffic in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates a new reality where global energy security depends on the ability of individual nations to negotiate with Iran, bypassing U.S. sanctions. Legitimization Through Blockade: Iran is using the strait as a “diplomatic exchange.” By agreeing to let tankers pass to India or other nations, Tehran is fracturing the unity of the anti-Iranian coalition. Countries desperate for energy are forced to recognize Iran’s agency in the strait, undermining U.S. efforts to achieve total isolation of the regime. Survival Economics vs. Military Might: Even under massive strikes from Israel and the U.S., Iran retains the capability to physically block or permit vessel transit. This renders the allies’ military operation less effective: while infrastructure can be destroyed, ensuring the safety of civilian shipping without Tehran’s consent remains nearly impossible. Fragile Balance for India and Asia: The fact that the primary beneficiaries of this “thaw” are LNG carriers for India indicates Iran’s attempt to maintain the loyalty of key Asian players. For New Delhi and Beijing, the Strait of Hormuz remains an indispensable route, and their willingness to negotiate with Tehran creates a significant geopolitical dilemma for the United States.

Russia’s Second Largest Refinery Halts Operations Following Drone Strike

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The Kirishinefteorgsintez (KINEF) refinery in the Leningrad region, one of the pillars of Russian oil processing, has ceased operations following a night-time drone attack on March 26. According to Reuters, the strikes disabled key units of the enterprise, leading to a complete shutdown of the production cycle. Scale of Damage and Consequences: Analytical Summary: The shutdown of KINEF is not just a local accident; it is a heavy blow to Russia’s energy security and export potential. Vulnerability of Giants: The fact that the country’s second-largest refinery has been disabled for the third time demonstrates the inability of air defense systems to provide reliable cover for critical infrastructure deep in the rear. The simultaneous hit on two units (AVT-4 and AVT-6) indicates high strike precision and an intent to completely paralyze the facility. Fuel Shortages and Prices: The loss of 7% of national refining capacity will inevitably trigger fuel shortages on the domestic market. The situation with diesel is particularly critical, as KINEF is one of its largest producers. This will lead to a new round of price hikes at gas stations and create problems for logistics and the spring sowing campaign. Technological Deadlock: The timeline for restoring AVT units remains uncertain. Under sanctions, replacing high-tech equipment and automation becomes an extremely difficult quest. Every week of downtime for KINEF means millions of tons of lost petroleum products and billions of rubles in losses for Surgutneftegaz and the state budget. The geography of the strikes (from Saratov to the Leningrad region) shows that safe zones for the Russian oil industry no longer exist.

Raids in Germany Target Company Broadcasting Russian TV

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German law enforcement has conducted raids at the headquarters of Kartina.TV, a major streaming provider of Russian-language programming worldwide. According to Spiegel, the operation was part of an investigation by the Frankfurt am Main prosecutor’s office into allegations of large-scale tax evasion involving Kartina.TV and Kartina Digital GmbH. On March 24, 150 officers from the tax crimes unit, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), and federal and regional police participated in the raids. Details of the Investigation: Analytical Summary: The crackdown on Kartina.TV by German authorities signals the end of the era of “gray” existence for Russian-language media empires in the West. End of the Offshore Haven: For a long time, such platforms operated in a legal vacuum, using complex schemes to funnel profits. The scale of the raids (150 officers) indicates that the prosecution possesses a significant evidentiary base. For Germany, this is not just a matter of taxes, but a question of financial transparency for structures with access to a multimillion-member audience. Political Undercurrent: Although the official motive is a tax crime, Kartina.TV has long been under scrutiny for broadcasting Russian state content, which the EU views as a tool of hybrid influence. Prosecuting leadership for financial fraud is the most effective way to paralyze the platform’s operations without resorting to complex political censorship procedures. A Lesson for the Diaspora: The prosecution of a major provider will inevitably lead to broadcasting interruptions and a loss of advertiser confidence. It serves as a signal to all Russian-language business projects in Europe: compliance with local laws will now be checked with double the scrutiny, and attempts to “sit on two stools” (earning in Europe while hiding taxes offshore) will be strictly suppressed.

Ukrainian Drones Strike One of Russia’s Largest Black Sea Oil Terminals for the Second Time This Spring

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On the night of April 6, 2026, Ukrainian drones launched a massive attack on the city of Novorossiysk in the Krasnodar Krai, according to Regional Governor Veniamin Kondratyev. The primary target was the Sheskharis oil terminal, one of the most strategically significant oil transshipment complexes in southern Russia. Kondratyev confirmed damage to several enterprises and reported eight injuries, including two children. This facility is a critical hub for Russia’s export infrastructure and, according to the Ukrainian General Staff, is actively used to supply Russian military groupings. Key details of the attack and its significance: Analytical Summary: The strikes on Sheskharis signal the beginning of an effective economic blockade of Russian Black Sea ports using a “mosquito fleet” of long-range drones. Vulnerability of the “Southern Gate”: Novorossiysk has remained Russia’s primary export hub as Baltic ports face increasing logistical hurdles. Systematic hits on the Sheskharis terminal make ship insurance in this region prohibitively expensive and the risk for tankers critical. This is a direct blow to the Russian budget, which remains heavily dependent on maritime raw material exports. Air Defense Dilemma: The fact that drones have penetrated the multi-layered defenses of such a vital port twice in a single month suggests a deficit in air defense systems in the southern theater. The priority given to protecting Moscow and the Crimean Bridge leaves industrial giants in the Krasnodar Krai only partially covered. Military Logistics Under Threat: Novorossiysk is increasingly replacing Sevastopol as the primary logistics base. Disabling the terminals and berths of Chernomortransneft strikes not only at the treasury but also at the fleet’s ability to receive fuel promptly. If these attacks become weekly, port operations could be paralyzed without a formal declaration of a naval blockade.

Armenia Threatens to Exit CSTO and EAEU if Russia Increases Gas Prices

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Armenia may withdraw from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) if Russia raises gas prices, stated Alen Simonyan, Speaker of the Armenian Parliament. “I must say that if they make such a decision, Armenia will make its own and finally leave the CSTO and the EAEU,” he said during a briefing. This ultimatum follows a recent “effective” discussion between Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Vladimir Putin, where the future of bilateral relations was debated amidst Armenia’s strategic pivot toward the European Union. Key details of the political crisis: Analytical Summary: The threat to exit the EAEU over gas prices marks Armenia’s transition from political “freezing” to economic counter-blackmail in response to Moscow’s pressure. The end of the monopoly of fear: For a long time, it was assumed that dependence on Russian gas and CSTO security made Armenia’s exit impossible. Today, Yerevan is demonstrating that it is willing to pay market prices for gas in exchange for political independence. While the CSTO has already de facto lost Armenia, the EAEU—the last project keeping the country within Russia’s orbit—is now under threat. The Karabakh Syndrome: The CSTO’s inaction during the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis has become a point of no return for Armenian society. Pashinyan uses this argument as an irrefutable justification for rapprochement with the West. The rhetoric of “we cannot explain the union’s inaction to our people” serves as a legitimate tool to dismantle allied obligations without losing domestic support. Transition to Europe: Simonyan’s reference to the “people’s choice” suggests that the groundwork is being laid for an official withdrawal from pro-Russian blocs. If Russia raises gas prices, it will be presented domestically as an “act of aggression,” providing the government with the necessary mandate to formally apply for EU candidacy.

Death in the “Shadow Fleet”: GRU General Andrey Averyanov Liquidated in Libya

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According to the French radio station RFI, a high-ranking GRU officer, Andrey Averyanov, was killed in a strike on the tanker Qendil in December 2025. The General, known as the curator of the most high-profile operations abroad (including activities in Africa following the death of Prigozhin), was on board the vessel accompanied by ten intelligence officers disguised as crew members. Key details of the operation and consequences: Analytical Summary: The death of Andrey Averyanov represents the most significant blow to the GRU since the end of the Cold War. Decapitation of the “Africa Corps”: Averyanov was the central figure in reassembling Russian assets in Africa. His death creates a leadership vacuum in Libya, Mali, and Burkina Faso, where Moscow is attempting to build a new architecture of influence. Without his personal connections and iron-fisted control, Russia’s expansion in the region is likely to stall. Tankers as legitimate targets: The use of civilian vessels to transport high-ranking intelligence command is a sign of a shortage of secure travel channels. However, the “shadow fleet” has now officially ceased to be “invisible” to the intelligence services of Ukraine and the West. The strike on the Qendil sets a precedent: any vessel circumventing sanctions is now viewed as a military target. Proxy war on new frontiers: The geography of the conflict has expanded to Libya and Turkey. Russia is shifting to a tactic of direct terror against Ukraine’s allies (as in the case of al-Haddad), which could lead to even greater isolation of Moscow in the Mediterranean. Libya, long a playground for Russian maneuvers, is transforming into a hunting zone for GRU operatives.

Sweden Seizes Third Russian Shadow Fleet Vessel in a Month

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The Swedish Coast Guard has detained the oil tanker Flora 1 off the country’s southern coast, marking the third seizure of a vessel linked to Russia’s “shadow fleet” in just 30 days. According to MarineTraffic, the tanker was traveling from the Russian port of Primorsk to an unknown destination. Swedish authorities suspect the vessel caused an oil spill 12 kilometers off the island of Gotland. Escalation in the Baltic: Analytical Summary: The detention of the Flora 1 signifies a shift in Western strategy: using environmental regulations as a primary tool to dismantle the shadow fleet. Ecology as a Legal Lever: Proving a violation of the “price cap” on the high seas is legally complex. However, an oil spill or inadequate insurance provides a direct legal basis for seizing vessels in territorial waters. Sweden’s Minister for Civil Defence, Carl-Oskar Bohlin, has explicitly labeled these aging, uninsured tankers as “serious threats to security and the environment.” The Baltic as a “NATO Lake”: Following Sweden’s accession to NATO, the monitoring of Baltic straits has reached a new level of intensity. Stockholm’s willingness to use boarding teams (as seen with the Sea Owl) makes the logistics through Primorsk and Ust-Luga increasingly hazardous. For the Kremlin, the shadow fleet—once a multi-billion dollar “untouchable” asset—is becoming a liability as each seizure exposes ownership chains and insurance loopholes.

Kremlin-Created Party for the Middle Class Becomes Russia’s Second Most Popular Force

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“New People” (Novye Lyudi), a party originally conceived by the Presidential Administration as a “spoiler” to absorb protest votes, has unexpectedly surged to second place in national polls. According to a VCIOM survey conducted in late March 2026, the party’s electoral rating reached 10.8%, overtaking long-standing systemic opposition fixtures like the LDPR (10.5%) and the Communist Party (CPRF, 9.8%). Analysis of the Surge: Analytical Summary: The rise of “New People” to second place is the clearest symptom of “silent protest” in Russia today. The Collapse of the Old Guard: Post-Zhirinovsky, the LDPR has lost its momentum, and the CPRF’s flirtation with repressive rhetoric has alienated modern voters. “New People” now represent the only legal refuge for citizens seeking a politics of common sense rather than phobias and restrictions. A Dilemma for the Kremlin: While the administration has successfully channeled protest into a loyalist structure, the fact that a “spoiler” is outperforming the primary pillars of the system (CPRF/LDPR) creates a risk. Should a political transition occur, this party could transform from a controlled instrument into a significant political actor with its own agency. P.S. This trend aligns perfectly with our internal analytical forecasts and data: the segment of Russians who currently do not approve of the war and the policy of isolation stands at approximately 10%. The electoral surge of “New People” effectively digitizes the “silent protest” of this group. You can view our detailed infographic on these social dynamics on our page (data as of last month).

Non-Commodity Exports Drop by $30 Billion Following Putin’s Claims That Russia Is “No Longer a Gas Station”

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Russia’s non-commodity non-energy exports (NCNE) totaled $163.6 billion in 2025, according to Roman Chekushov, Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade. While the ministry highlights an 11% increase compared to the disastrous 2024, the figures reveal that Russia’s push for economic diversification remains a facade. The Reality Behind the Numbers: Analytical Summary: The growth in non-commodity exports in 2025 is merely a “low base effect” following the catastrophic slump of 2024, when volumes hit a seven-year low. A Gas Station with Empty Tanks: The Kremlin attempts to frame the slight decrease in oil’s share of exports as a success for diversification. In reality, this is a consequence of heavy sanction discounts and a deteriorating global market. Russia isn’t selling more advanced machinery; it is simply receiving less revenue per barrel of oil. Low-Value Exports: Even within the non-commodity category, growth is driven by raw materials with minimal processing—fertilizers, metals, and agricultural products. The high-tech sector continues to degrade as sanctions block access to essential Western components and markets. The Illusion of Global Demand: While the Ministry of Industry and Trade claims Russian products are “in demand,” it ignores the fact that exports to “friendly” nations often come with massive discounts and logistical costs that erase profits. Ultimately, the Russian economy remains a hostage to the commodity model, now with a crippled technological core.