Andrey Klishas, head of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation, delivered a programmatic statement in an interview with RBC: a significant portion of the repressive norms and restrictions introduced in Russia after 2022 will remain in force for years, perhaps forever.
According to Klishas, the authorities do not plan an automatic return to peacetime legal standards. Every restriction will be tested for “relevance” and “usefulness.”
Key points from Klishas’s statement:
- “Useful” Restrictions: Certain “war-time” norms may be deemed “useful” by the state and will remain in the legal field indefinitely.
- Lack of Criteria: The concept of “relevance” remains undefined, giving the authorities a blank check to maintain any ban (from military censorship to travel restrictions).
- Gradualism (or Infinity): The lifting of restrictions will not be simultaneous. “The situation may vary depending on the norm,” the senator emphasized.
Analytical Summary:
Klishas’s statement is more than a legal commentary; it is a strategic warning to Europe. Russia is officially codifying a model of “permanent mobilization.”
The “Useful Norms” Trap: When the government labels the restriction of citizens’ rights as “useful,” it means the repressive apparatus developed during the war has become the bedrock of state governance. This “emergency state” is becoming the new normal. It is a clear signal that the Kremlin has no intention of returning to a global system of checks, balances, and legal guarantees.
The Threat of Latent Aggression: Maintaining military laws even if the conflict in Ukraine is formally concluded (or frozen) is a classic preparation for a new round of aggression. A military machine and a legal field adapted for war do not “disarm” for no reason. If the legislation remains on a war footing, it implies that the regime’s objectives extend far beyond current borders.
A Warning for the West: Europe must realize that any verbal “de-escalation” from the RF will be accompanied by further internal hardening of the regime. This creates a “coiled spring” scenario: an economy shifted to 12-hour workdays (as proposed by Deripaska) and a society living by martial law will eventually require new external enemies to justify continued hardships. This makes the risk of aggression against the Baltic states or Poland not just possible, but a logical extension of the Kremlin’s domestic policy in the medium term.