Rubel falls to six-month low despite easing of US sanctions

Despite the easing of US sanctions against Russian oil and the rise in prices for domestic grades to $70-80 per barrel, the ruble accelerated its decline against key global currencies. On Friday, the yuan exchange rate on the Moscow Exchange rose to 11.69 rubles (the highest since September), the dollar on the over-the-counter market climbed to 80.66 rubles, and the euro to 92.47 rubles. Since the beginning of March, the ruble has lost almost 5% against the yuan and about 4% against the dollar, closing in the red for the fourth consecutive week. The primary driver of this weakening was the decision to halt currency sales from the National Wealth Fund (NWF) to cover the budget deficit. Suspension of currency interventions and the state of the NWF The Ministry of Finance suspended currency sales as of March 6, which in recent months had reached a record $2 billion per month. According to VTB estimates, this decision could weaken the ruble by another 10% against the yuan. This measure is intended to preserve the remaining assets of the NWF, whose liquid assets have decreased 2.5 times since the start of the military conflict, while foreign currency reserves have fallen to their lowest levels since 2008. Analytical summary: The suspension of interventions to save NWF reserves leaves the ruble without support, making it a hostage to the budget deficit. In 2026, this will inevitably trigger an inflationary spiral and further devaluation regardless of oil price levels.

Massive losses for private investors due to a wave of defaults in the debt market

A sharp increase in the number of corporate defaults in 2025 dealt a major blow to the capital of individuals. According to the Bank of Russia’s review, private investors held 45% of all bonds of companies that defaulted for the first time during the reporting period. The total volume of citizen investments remaining in the assets of defaulted issuers is estimated by the regulator at 22 billion rubles, highlighting the vulnerability of the retail segment to systemic economic risks. Statistics of affected parties and trading dynamics The Central Bank recorded that 163,000 people conducted transactions with the securities of troubled companies throughout the year. Although some investors managed to exit their positions before the official declaration of insolvency, a significant mass of holders faced a partial or total loss of their invested funds. The high participation of individuals in bonds with low credit ratings became a key factor in such large-scale losses amid the general slowdown in business activity. Analytical conclusions and consequences The current situation demonstrates a critical decline in the stability of the domestic debt market. Massive defaults undermine the confidence of private investors in the stock market as a savings tool, which in 2026 will lead to capital outflow into more conservative instruments or cash currency. The reduction in the inflow of retail investment will limit the corporate sector’s ability to refinance debt, creating a “domino effect” risk for companies with high debt loads.

Financial collapse of the largest tanker fleet operator under sanction pressure

The state-owned shipping company Sovcomflot, a key link in the export logistics of Russian hydrocarbons, ended 2025 with a net loss of $648 million. These figures completely offset the previous year’s profit of $424 million. The company’s revenue decreased by 30%, falling to $1.31 billion, while EBITDA showed a twofold drop, amounting to only $518 million, indicating a sharp loss of operational efficiency. Sanctions blockade and asset impairment The primary cause of financial degradation was the mass inclusion of the company’s tankers in sanctions lists, leading to the write-off and impairment of the fleet amounting to $550 million. Direct restrictive measures provoked long-term vessel idle time and a critical reduction in capacity utilization. According to Freedom Finance estimates, the situation was exacerbated by a sharp increase in insurance costs and the complication of logistical schemes, making the operation of part of the Aframax class fleet economically unviable. Analytical conclusions and consequences This precedent indicates a critical situation for the country’s energy infrastructure. The unprofitability of Sovcomflot undermines the state’s ability to safely export raw materials and forces a reliance on less reliable intermediaries from the shadow sector. In 2026, this could lead to a further increase in the discount on Russian oil and the need for direct budget injections to maintain the viability of the largest national carrier, draining the system’s resources.

Record growth of Russian business losses at the end of 2025

The aggregate loss of Russian organizations in 2025 increased by 7.5%, reaching a critical mark of 8.9 trillion rubles. According to Rosstat data cited by Vedomosti, the total number of loss-making companies reached 17,200 (or 27.1% of the market). Against this backdrop, the net profit of the profitable sector decreased by 1.3% to 35.9 trillion rubles, leading to a drop in the total balanced financial result of the entire economy by 3.9% — to 27 trillion rubles. Sectoral degradation of financial indicators The most massive decline in profit was recorded in strategic sectors: motor vehicle production collapsed by 79.7%, freight transportation by 77.4%, and oil and gas extraction by 63.9%. In several industries, the share of loss-making enterprises exceeded the critical threshold of 50%. Leaders in deficit were the coal industry (66.1% of loss-making companies), the utilities sector (63.8%), and hydrocarbon extraction (50.9%), indicating a systemic crisis in profitability. Analytical conclusions and consequences This dynamic is characterized as Усиление давления (Increased pressure) on the state’s resource base. The sharp decline in profit in the extraction sector and the automotive industry testifies to the inefficiency of import substitution and rising costs for logistics and servicing sanction risks. In 2026, this will inevitably lead to a reduction in tax revenues to the budget and a decrease in private business investment activity, undermining the long-term resource of the system.

Record contraction in Russian investment activity over the past decade

In 2025, the volume of fixed capital investment contracted by 2.3%, marking the deepest decline since 2015. Data from Rosstat and the HSE Development Center record a negative dynamic that intensified throughout the reporting period: from a 6.5% growth in the first quarter to a 5.3% drop in the fourth. The current downturn surpassed even the figures from the pandemic year of 2020, when the decline was only 0.1%, indicating the exhaustion of internal growth resources. Sectoral polarization and project freezes According to an RSPP survey, approximately 15% of companies completely froze their investment programs, while over 60% significantly or slightly reduced them. The main blow fell on sectors with high sensitivity to the key interest rate — construction and transport, as well as extractive sectors (coal and oil & gas industries). Positive dynamics were maintained only in segments focused on the military-industrial complex and pharmaceuticals, confirming the economy’s skew toward the state defense order. Analytical conclusions and consequences This situation is classified as (Increased pressure) on the country’s economic potential. The near-zero dynamic in nominal terms expected by the Ministry of Economic Development in 2026 effectively means a continued real investment downturn due to high inflation. Stagnation of fixed capital investments in civilian sectors will lead to technological degradation and reduced competitiveness, undermining the system’s long-term sustainability and limiting opportunities for real import substitution.

Swedish detention of a Russian “shadow” tanker in the Baltic Sea

The seizure of the oil tanker Sea Owl near the port of Trelleborg on March 12 marks the second incident involving “shadow fleet” vessels in a single week. Sweden’s Minister for Civil Defence, Carl-Oskar Bohlin, reported that the 228-meter vessel, bound for the Russian port of Primorsk, allegedly lacks legitimate state affiliation. The Swedish Coast Guard has initiated an investigation into the tanker, which is already included in EU sanction lists for transporting Russian energy resources in defiance of restrictions. Technical violations and environmental risks The investigation established that the Sea Owl was operating under a fraudulent Comoros flag, a fact supported by data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence and The Insider. Such practices of concealing jurisdiction are a key characteristic of the fleet servicing Russian raw material exports. Swedish authorities state there are serious threats to maritime safety and risks of an environmental catastrophe in the Baltic Sea due to the poor technical condition of the vessel, which previously operated on a route from Santos, Brazil. Analytical conclusions and consequences This incident confirms that Baltic region countries are moving toward active physical opposition to logistical schemes used to bypass sanctions. The increased oversight by the Swedish Coast Guard, which also affected the bulk carrier Caffa, sets a precedent for blocking key oil export routes through the Baltic. In 2026, this could lead to rising operational costs for Russian exporters and the need to seek even riskier transportation routes, increasing the strain on the system’s resources.

Real estate market stagnation following mortgage program reforms

Developers sold only 1.6 million sq m of housing in February, a 1.5-fold decrease compared to January figures. Data from “Dom.RF” confirms a sharp cooling: developer revenue dropped by 34% to 333 billion rubles. While the year-on-year decline is less pronounced—13% by area and 11% in monetary terms—the trend toward prolonged stagnation is becoming evident against the backdrop of high interest rates. Market reaction to family mortgage tightening The primary driver of the decline was the change in lending conditions for the most popular subsidized program. As a result, mortgage issuance in February plummeted by 40% compared to the previous month, reaching 285 billion rubles. This liquidity squeeze directly impacted sales figures, forcing developers to revise marketing strategies amid a deficit of solvent demand. Analytical conclusions and consequences Current dynamics indicate the construction industry’s transition into a phase of adaptation to market conditions without large-scale state support. The reduction in funds flowing into escrow accounts could lead to higher project financing costs and the freezing of some new projects in 2026. In the long term, this will limit supply, preventing a decrease in housing prices despite falling consumer purchasing power.

Russian New Home Sales Plunge 50% Following Subsidy Cuts

Russia’s primary housing market has sharply contracted: in February, apartment sales fell 1.5 times to 1.6 million sqm, according to Dom.RF. Developer revenue dropped by a third to 333 billion rubles. Year-on-year, the decline is evident in both floor space (-13%) and monetary value (-11%). Family Mortgage Crisis The primary driver of the collapse was the tightening of “Family Mortgage” terms. Due to new restrictions, mortgage lending volumes fell by 40% in February (to 285 billion rubles). The developers’ heavy reliance on state subsidies led to an immediate demand drop following the cuts. End of the Cheap Money Era The housing market has reached a deadlock: without state support, current prices are unaffordable for most citizens. High interest rates and reduced subsidies are forcing developers to find new survival models, threatening the stability of the entire construction sector.

War in Iran Boosts Russia’s Oil Revenues by 150 Million Dollars Daily

The surge in oil prices resulting from the conflict in the Middle East has provided a significant financial boost to the Kremlin. According to Financial Times calculations, the Russian budget is currently receiving between 110 and 160 million dollars in additional daily revenue. In the first 12 days of the war alone, Moscow’s nominal earnings reached up to 1.9 billion dollars. If average prices remain in the 70–80 dollar per barrel range, additional March revenues could approach 5 billion dollars. India and China Compete for Russian Barrels India has taken advantage of temporary US waivers, sharply increasing its purchases: in just five days, contracts for 30 million barrels were signed—an amount equal to the entire import volume for February. Analysts at Kpler note that amid the shortage, Indian companies have shifted from demanding discounts to paying premiums, offering 5 dollars over the Brent price. With Middle Eastern routes paralyzed, India and China are effectively competing for Russian crude, pushing shipment volumes to Indian ports toward 2 million barrels per day. Collapse of Sanctions on Maritime Services The price of Urals crude has reached 85 dollars per barrel, a peak not seen since 2022. Robin Brooks of the Brookings Institution observes that at these price levels, the EU ban on providing maritime services in European ports—a key part of the 20th sanctions package—is effectively “dead.” Russia has temporarily emerged as the primary beneficiary of the conflict, using high prices not only to fill its coffers but also to increase pressure on Washington to further ease the sanctions regime.

US Vows Not to Lift Sanctions on Russian Oil Following Dmitriev’s Visit to Trump

Plans discussed by the US for potential easing of sanctions against Russia to mitigate the energy crisis caused by the war in Iran have been scrapped. US Energy Secretary Chris Wright confirmed in a CNN interview that Washington does not plan to lift restrictive measures on Russian oil. Furthermore, the US plans to implement uranium sanctions in the future, phasing out Russian fuel for nuclear power plants. Failure of the Kremlin’s Key Negotiator Wright’s statements came just a day after Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund and a key negotiator for the Kremlin, visited Florida. Dmitriev held talks with officials at Mar-a-Lago regarding “interaction in energy markets.” While Dmitriev claimed the US is beginning to understand Russia’s “systemic role,” Dmitry Peskov admitted it is too early to speak of any effective cooperation. Isolation Instead of an Energy Reprieve For Europe, this is a clear signal: the Trump administration is not prepared to sacrifice strategic pressure on the aggressor for short-term market stability. The Kremlin’s attempt to use the Iranian war as leverage for blackmail has failed. Instead of the expected lifting of restrictions, Moscow faces the prospect of sanctions expanding into the nuclear sector, permanently stripping Russia of its “energy superpower” status in Western markets.