Threat

The Russian army is preparing for a new offensive in Ukraine amid stalled peace negotiations, Bloomberg reports, citing sources familiar with Kremlin discussions. According to one source, the conflict—which has already lasted longer than the Great Patriotic War—could continue for another one to two years unless a breakthrough is achieved at the negotiating table. Key Aspects of the Kremlin’s Strategy: Analytical Summary: The decision to prolong the war for another two years confirms that the Russian regime has shifted into a mode of “existence for the sake of the process,” rather than a specific result. Information Blockade as a Precursor: The tightening of internet controls is a classic preparation for unpopular measures. Closing the information space is essential for the Kremlin to minimize protests during a potential new wave of conscription. The Offensive Trap: Preparing for a “new offensive” that even Kremlin insiders doubt will succeed appears to be a move for the regime’s political survival. Without real victories, Putin must maintain the illusion of progress to justify the transition to “war-time laws” previously mentioned by Senator Klishas. For society, this means two more years of living under the shadow of deficits, inflation, and the fear of mobilization.

Andrey Klishas, head of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation, delivered a programmatic statement in an interview with RBC: a significant portion of the repressive norms and restrictions introduced in Russia after 2022 will remain in force for years, perhaps forever. According to Klishas, the authorities do not plan an automatic return to peacetime legal standards. Every restriction will be tested for “relevance” and “usefulness.” Key points from Klishas’s statement: Analytical Summary: Klishas’s statement is more than a legal commentary; it is a strategic warning to Europe. Russia is officially codifying a model of “permanent mobilization.” The “Useful Norms” Trap: When the government labels the restriction of citizens’ rights as “useful,” it means the repressive apparatus developed during the war has become the bedrock of state governance. This “emergency state” is becoming the new normal. It is a clear signal that the Kremlin has no intention of returning to a global system of checks, balances, and legal guarantees. The Threat of Latent Aggression: Maintaining military laws even if the conflict in Ukraine is formally concluded (or frozen) is a classic preparation for a new round of aggression. A military machine and a legal field adapted for war do not “disarm” for no reason. If the legislation remains on a war footing, it implies that the regime’s objectives extend far beyond current borders. A Warning for the West: Europe must realize that any verbal “de-escalation” from the RF will be accompanied by further internal hardening of the regime. This creates a “coiled spring” scenario: an economy shifted to 12-hour workdays (as proposed by Deripaska) and a society living by martial law will eventually require new external enemies to justify continued hardships. This makes the risk of aggression against the Baltic states or Poland not just possible, but a logical extension of the Kremlin’s domestic policy in the medium term.

Russia has established a network of secret training camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Serbia, to prepare agents aimed at destabilizing Europe. According to Politico, citing an investigation by Moldovan intelligence services, this network was used to train spies in tactics for mass unrest and sabotage. Dozens have already been detained in Moldova, and traces of these “graduates” lead to acts of sabotage in France and Germany. Details of the Training Program: Analytical Summary: The discovery of this camp network in the Balkans is direct evidence of the Kremlin’s transition to the “kinetic” phase of hybrid warfare in Europe. The Balkan Bridgehead: Using Bosnia and Herzegovina (primarily the Republika Srpska) and Serbia as training bases highlights the vulnerability of this region. Russia exploits weak security controls and the political loyalty of local elites to create “gray zones” where combat groups can be prepared with impunity right under NATO’s nose. Moldova as a Proving Ground: The primary strike of this network was directed at Chișinău. The attempt to organize mass unrest using trained saboteurs is a classic “soft coup” scenario designed to halt the republic’s European integration. A Threat to the EU Core: The fact that graduates from these Balkan camps have already “surfaced” in Germany and France indicates that the network was not created solely for local Moldovan needs. Russia is building an infrastructure for long-term terror, utilizing cheap mercenary labor. This will force European intelligence services to radically reconsider how they monitor “political tourism” and Russian-speaking diasporas, which will inevitably lead to a new round of tightened visa and policing measures within the EU.

U.S. President Donald Trump has publicly endorsed Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for April 12. Posting on his social network, Truth Social, the White House leader called Orbán a “true friend, fighter, and winner,” emphasizing that relations between Washington and Budapest have reached “new heights.” Context of the Election Race: Analytical Summary: Trump’s intervention in the Hungarian elections is a desperate attempt to rescue his primary ideological ally in Europe, whose “vertical of power” has begun to show serious cracks. Collapse of the Patriotism Monopoly: The phenomenon of Péter Magyar lies in his ability to beat Orbán with his own weapons. As a former insider, he has hijacked the national interest agenda, adding demands for social justice and an end to nepotism. This is the most dangerous scenario for Orbán: he is not facing an “abstract liberal,” but someone who knows the inner workings of the Fidesz power machine. Trump’s Bet: For the White House, an Orbán defeat would be a painful blow to the concept of the “Conservative International.” Hungary has long served as the flagship for “illiberal democracy” within the EU—a model championed by Trump’s supporters. If Orbán loses on April 12, Trump will lose his most reliable “voice” in Europe, and the EU will gain a chance to dismantle the “Hungarian anomaly” from within. The Fatigue Factor: The 9-point gap in favor of the opposition suggests that Hungarian society has reached a saturation point with ideological rhetoric and is demanding solutions to real economic problems. While Trump’s rhetoric may mobilize Orbán’s core base, it is unlikely to win back those disillusioned by the falling standard of living under an immovable leader.

On March 23, 2026, Russia launched the first 16 serial satellites of the “Rassvet” constellation into orbit. The project, positioned as the domestic response to the Starlink system, is being implemented by “Bureau 1440” (part of “IKS Holding”). This structure specializes in the production of surveillance systems (SORM) and internet blocking tools (TSPU). Technical and financial parameters of the project: Analysis and Conclusion: The creation of “Rassvet” by developers of internet censorship equipment poses a direct threat to digital freedom. Unlike the global SpaceX project, the Russian satellite network is being designed from the outset as a dual-use tool under the control of special services. The main danger lies in the creation of a “sovereign space internet,” which will allow the authorities to completely isolate the country’s information field, ensuring uninterrupted communication for security forces while simultaneously disconnecting terrestrial backbone channels for the civilian population. Effectively, a global “celestial shield” for SORM is being built at the taxpayers’ expense.

European diplomats are expressing serious concern regarding the access of Alternative for Germany (AfD) deputies to the confidential EuDoX database. According to Politico, this channel may allow classified reports on internal EU leadership discussions to fall into the hands of the Kremlin. Scale of the threat and access mechanisms: Anton Hofreiter, chairman of the Bundestag EU Affairs Committee, confirmed that the party is reasonably suspected of systematically leaking information to Russia and China. Analysis and Conclusion: The AfD situation exposes a systemic vulnerability in European bureaucracy. The principles of transparency and parliamentary oversight in Germany are becoming tools for industrial and political espionage in favor of the Kremlin. The fact that EU institutions have not yet restricted EuDoX access for parties with questionable reputations points to Europe’s institutional sluggishness in the face of hybrid threats. The likely next step will be a rigorous revision of access regulations to internal EU networks for national parliaments.